Neither can he love that which he does not desire?
He cannot.
And he who not is not a lover of friend?
Clearly not.
What place then is there for friendship, if, when absent, good men
have no need of one another (for even when alone they are sufficient
for themselves), and when present have no use of one another? How can
such persons ever be induced to value one another?
They cannot.
And friends they cannot be, unless they value one another?
Very true.
But see now, Lysis, whether we are not being deceived in all this-are
we not indeed entirely wrong?
How so? he replied.
Have I not heard some one say, as I just now recollect, that the like
is the greatest enemy of the like, the good of the good?-Yes, and he
quoted the authority of Hesiod, who says:
Potter quarrels with potter, hard with bard,
Beggar with beggar; and of all other things he affirmed, in like
manner, "That of necessity the most like are most full of envy,
strife, and hatred of one another, and the most unlike, of friendship.
For the poor man is compelled to be the friend of the rich, and the
weak requires the aid of the strong, and the sick man of the
physician; and every one who is ignorant, has to love and court him
who knows." And indeed he went on to say in grandiloquent language,
that the idea of friendship existing between similars is not the
truth, but the very reverse of the truth, and that the most opposed
are the most friendly; for that everything desires not like but that
which is most unlike: for example, the dry desires the moist, the cold
the hot, the bitter the sweet, the sharp the blunt, the void the full,
the full the void, and so of all other things; for the opposite is the
food of the opposite, whereas like receives nothing from like. And I
thought that he who said this was a charming man, and that he spoke
well. What do the rest of you say?
I should say, at first hearing, that he is right, said Menexenus.
Then we are to say that the greatest friendship is of opposites?
Exactly.
Yes, Menexenus; but will not that be a monstrous answer? and will not
the all-wise eristics be down upon us in triumph, and ask, fairly
enough, whether love is not the very opposite of hate; and what answer
shall we make to them-must we not admit that they speak the truth?
We must.
They will then proceed to ask whether the enemy is the friend of the
friend, or the friend the friend of the enemy?
Neither, he replied.
Well, but is a just man the friend of the unjust, or the temperate of
the intemperate, or the good of the bad?
I do not see how that is possible.
And yet, I said, if friendship goes by contraries, the contraries must
be friends.
They must.
Then neither like and like nor unlike and unlike are friends.
I suppose not.
And yet there is a further consideration: may not all these notions of
friendship be erroneous? but may not that which is neither good nor
evil still in some cases be the friend of the good?
How do you mean? he said.
Why really, I said, the truth is that I do not know; but my head is
dizzy with thinking of the argument, and therefore I hazard the
conjecture, that "the beautiful is the friend," as the old proverb
says. Beauty is certainly a soft, smooth, slippery thing, and
therefore of a nature which easily slips in and permeates our souls.
For I affirm that the good is the beautiful. You will agree to that?
Yes.