assimilated, and are white by the presence of white.
Certainly.
Now I want to know whether in all cases a substance is assimilated by
the presence of another substance; or must the presence be after a
peculiar sort?
The latter, he said.
Then that which is neither good nor evil may be in the presence of
evil, but not as yet evil, and that has happened before now?
Yes.
And when anything is in the presence of evil, not being as yet evil,
the presence of good arouses the desire of good in that thing; but the
presence of evil, which makes a thing evil, takes away the desire and
friendship of the good; for that which was once both good and evil has
now become evil only, and the good was supposed to have no friendship
with the evil?
None.
And therefore we say that those who are already wise, whether Gods or
men, are no longer lovers of wisdom; nor can they be lovers of wisdom
who are ignorant to the extent of being evil, for no evil or ignorant
person is a lover of wisdom. There remain those who have the
misfortune to be ignorant, but are not yet hardened in their
ignorance, or void of understanding, and do not as yet fancy that they
know what they do not know: and therefore those who are the lovers of
wisdom are as yet neither good nor bad. But the bad do not love wisdom
any more than the good; for, as we have already seen, neither is
unlike the friend of unlike, nor like of like. You remember that?
Yes, they both said.
And so, Lysis and Menexenus, we have discovered the nature of
friendship-there can be no doubt of it: Friendship is the love which
by reason of the presence of evil the neither good nor evil has of the
good, either in the soul, or in the body, or anywhere.
They both agreed and entirely assented, and for a moment I rejoiced
and was satisfied like a huntsman just holding fast his prey. But then
a most unaccountable suspicion came across me, and I felt that the
conclusion was untrue. I was pained, and said, Alas! Lysis and
Menexenus, I am afraid that we have been grasping at a shadow only.
Why do you say so? said Menexenus.
I am afraid, I said, that the argument about friendship is false:
arguments, like men, are often pretenders.
How do you mean? he asked.
Well, I said; look at the matter in this way: a friend is the friend
of some one; is he not?
Certainly he is.
And has he a motive and object in being a friend, or has he no motive
and object?
He has a motive and object.
And is the object which makes him a friend, dear to him, neither dear
nor hateful to him?
I do not quite follow you, he said.
I do not wonder at that, I said. But perhaps, if I put the matter in
another way, you will be able to follow me, and my own meaning will be
clearer to myself. The sick man, as I was just now saying, is the
friend of the physician-is he not?
Yes.
And he is the friend of the physician because of disease, and for the
sake of health?
Yes.
And disease is an evil?
Certainly.
And what of health? I said. Is that good or evil, or neither?
Good, he replied.
And we were saying, I believe, that the body being neither good nor
evil, because of disease, that is to say because of evil, is the
friend of medicine, and medicine is a good: and medicine has entered