meno   

some other quality, as for example beauty, size, or shape? How would

you answer me?

Men. I should answer that bees do not differ from one another, as

bees.

Soc. And if I went on to say: That is what I desire to know, Meno;

tell me what is the quality in which they do not differ, but are all

alike;-would you be able to answer?

Men. I should.

Soc. And so of the virtues, however many and different they may

be, they have all a common nature which makes them virtues; and on

this he who would answer the question, "What is virtue?" would do well

to have his eye fixed: Do you understand?

Men. I am beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold

of the question as I could wish.

Soc. When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man,

another of a woman, another of a child, and so on, does this apply

only to virtue, or would you say the same of health, and size, and

strength? Or is the nature of health always the same, whether in man

or woman?

Men. I should say that health is the same, both in man and woman.

Soc. And is not this true of size and strength? If a woman is

strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and of the

same strength subsisting in her which there is in the man. I mean to

say that strength, as strength, whether of man or woman, is the

same. Is there any difference?

Men. I think not.

Soc. And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether in a child

or in a grown-up person, in a woman or in a man?

Men. I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that this case is different

from the others.

Soc. But why? Were you not saying that the virtue of a man was to

order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house?