meno   

Men. I did say so.

Soc. And can either house or state or anything be well ordered

without temperance and without justice?

Men. Certainly not.

Soc. Then they who order a state or a house temperately or justly

order them with temperance and justice?

Men. Certainly.

Soc. Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and

women, must have the same virtues of temperance and justice?

Men. True.

Soc. And can either a young man or an elder one be good, if they are

intemperate and unjust?

Men. They cannot.

Soc. They must be temperate and just?

Men. Yes.

Soc. Then all men are good in the same way, and by participation

in the same virtues?

Men. Such is the inference.

Soc. And they surely would not have been good in the same way,

unless their virtue had been the same?

Men. They would not.

Soc. Then now that the sameness of all virtue has been proven, try

and remember what you and Gorgias say that virtue is.

Men. Will you have one definition of them all?

Soc. That is what I am seeking.

Men. If you want to have one definition of them all, I know not what

to say, but that virtue is the power of governing mankind.

Soc. And does this definition of virtue include all virtue? Is

virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Can the child

govern his father, or the slave his master; and would he who

governed be any longer a slave?

Men. I think not, Socrates.