meno   

Soc. No, indeed; there would be small reason in that. Yet once more,

fair friend; according to you, virtue is "the power of governing"; but

do you not add "justly and not unjustly"?

Men. Yes, Socrates; I agree there; for justice is virtue.

Soc. Would you say "virtue," Meno, or "a virtue"?

Men. What do you mean?

Soc. I mean as I might say about anything; that a round, for

example, is "a figure" and not simply "figure," and I should adopt

this mode of speaking, because there are other figures.

Men. Quite right; and that is just what I am saying about

virtue-that there are other virtues as well as justice.

Soc. What are they? tell me the names of them, as I would tell you

the names of the other figures if you asked me.

Men. Courage and temperance and wisdom and magnanimity are

virtues; and there are many others.

Soc. Yes, Meno; and again we are in the same case: in searching

after one virtue we have found many, though not in the same way as

before; but we have been unable to find the common virtue which runs

through them all.

Men. Why, Socrates, even now I am not able to follow you in the

attempt to get at one common notion of virtue as of other things.

Soc. No wonder; but I will try to get nearer if I can, for you

know that all things have a common notion. Suppose now that some one

asked you the question which I asked before: Meno, he would say,

what is figure? And if you answered "roundness," he would reply to

you, in my way of speaking, by asking whether you would say that

roundness is "figure" or "a figure"; and you would answer "a figure."

Men. Certainly.

Soc. And for this reason-that there are other figures?

Men. Yes.

Soc. And if he proceeded to ask, What other figures are there? you

would have told him.