meno   

you not answer that question, Meno? I wish that you would try; the

attempt will be good practice with a view to the answer about virtue.

Men. I would rather that you should answer, Socrates.

Soc. Shall I indulge you?

Men. By all means.

Soc. And then you will tell me about virtue?

Men. I will.

Soc. Then I must do my best, for there is a prize to be won.

Men. Certainly.

Soc. Well, I will try and explain to you what figure is. What do you

say to this answer?-Figure is the only thing which always follows

colour. Will you be satisfied with it, as I am sure that I should

be, if you would let me have a similar definition of virtue?

Men. But, Socrates, it is such a simple answer.

Soc. Why simple?

Men. Because, according to you, figure is that which always

follows colour.

(Soc. Granted.)

Men. But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour

is, any more than what figure is-what sort of answer would you have

given him?

Soc. I should have told him the truth. And if he were a

philosopher of the eristic and antagonistic sort, I should say to him:

You have my answer, and if I am wrong, your business is to take up the

argument and refute me. But if we were friends, and were talking as

you and I are now, I should reply in a milder strain and more in the

dialectician's vein; that is to say, I should not only speak the

truth, but I should make use of premisses which the person

interrogated would be willing to admit. And this is the way in which I

shall endeavour to approach you. You will acknowledge, will you not,

that there is such a thing as an end, or termination, or

extremity?-all which words use in the same sense, although I am