meno   

that evils are hurtful to the possessor of them, know that they will

be hurt by them?

Men. They must know it.

Soc. And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are miserable

in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them?

Men. How can it be otherwise?

Soc. But are not the miserable ill-fated?

Men. Yes, indeed.

Soc. And does any one desire to be miserable and ill-fated?

Men. I should say not, Socrates.

Soc. But if there is no one who desires to be miserable, there is no

one, Meno, who desires evil; for what is misery but the desire and

possession of evil?

Men. That appears to be the truth, Socrates, and I admit that nobody

desires evil.

Soc. And yet, were you not saying just now that virtue is the desire

and power of attaining good?

Men. Yes, I did say so.

Soc. But if this be affirmed, then the desire of good is common to

all, and one man is no better than another in that respect?

Men. True.

Soc. And if one man is not better than another in desiring good,

he must be better in the power of attaining it?

Men. Exactly.

Soc. Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to be

the power of attaining good?

Men. I entirely approve, Socrates, of the manner in which you now

view this matter.

Soc. Then let us see whether what you say is true from another point

of view; for very likely you may be right:-You affirm virtue to be the

power of attaining goods?

Men. Yes.