meno   

Soc. And the goods which mean are such as health and wealth and

the possession of gold and silver, and having office and honour in the

state-those are what you would call goods?

Men. Yes, I should include all those.

Soc. Then, according to Meno, who is the hereditary friend of the

great king, virtue is the power of getting silver and gold; and

would you add that they must be gained piously, justly, or do you deem

this to be of no consequence? And is any mode of acquisition, even

if unjust and dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue?

Men. Not virtue, Socrates, but vice.

Soc. Then justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part of

virtue, as would appear, must accompany the acquisition, and without

them the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue.

Men. Why, how can there be virtue without these?

Soc. And the non-acquisition of gold and silver in a dishonest

manner for oneself or another, or in other words the want of them, may

be equally virtue?

Men. True.

Soc. Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the

non-acquisition and want of them, but whatever is accompanied by

justice or honesty is virtue, and whatever is devoid of justice is

vice.

Men. It cannot be otherwise, in my judgment.

Soc. And were we not saying just now that justice, temperance, and

the like, were each of them a part of virtue?

Men. Yes.

Soc. And so, Meno, this is the way in which you mock me.

Men. Why do you say that, Socrates?

Soc. Why, because I asked you to deliver virtue into my hands

whole and unbroken, and I gave you a pattern according to which you

were to frame your answer; and you have forgotten already, and tell me

that virtue is the power of attaining good justly, or with justice;