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is of such a nature, it will be taught; and if not, not?

Men. Certainly.

Soc. The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of another

species?

Men. Yes, that appears to be the -question which comes next in

order.

Soc. Do we not say that virtue is a good?-This is a hypothesis which

is not set aside.

Men. Certainly.

Soc. Now, if there be any sort-of good which is distinct from

knowledge, virtue may be that good; but if knowledge embraces all

good, then we shall be right in think in that virtue is knowledge?

Men. True.

Soc. And virtue makes us good?

Men. Yes.

Soc. And if we are good, then we are profitable; for all good things

are profitable?

Men. Yes.

Soc. Then virtue is profitable?

Men. That is the only inference.

Soc. Then now let us see what are the things which severally

profit us. Health and strength, and beauty and wealth-these, and the

like of these, we call profitable?

Men. True.

Soc. And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm: would you

not think so?

Men. Yes.

Soc. And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable

or the reverse? Are they not profitable when they are rightly used,

and hurtful when they are not rightly used?

Men. Certainly.

Soc. Next, let us consider the goods of the soul: they are