meno   

wrongly.

Men. Yes.

Soc. And is not this universally true of human nature? All other

things hang upon the soul, and the things of the soul herself hang

upon wisdom, if they are to be good; and so wisdom is inferred to be

that which profits-and virtue, as we say, is profitable?

Men. Certainly.

Soc. And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either

wholly or partly wisdom?

Men. I think that what you are saying, Socrates, is very true.

Soc. But if this is true, then the good are not by nature good?

Men. I think not.

Soc. If they had been, there would assuredly have been discerners of

characters among us who would have known our future great men; and

on their showing we should have adopted them, and when we had got

them, we should have kept them in the citadel out of the way of

harm, and set a stamp upon them far rather than upon a piece of

gold, in order that no one might tamper with them; and when they

grew up they would have been useful to the state?

Men. Yes, Socrates, that would have been the right way.

Soc. But if the good are not by nature good, are they made good by

instruction?

Men. There appears to be no other alternative, Socrates. On the

supposition that virtue is knowledge, there can be no doubt that

virtue is taught.

Soc. Yes, indeed; but what if the supposition is erroneous?

Men. I certainly thought just now that we were right.

Soc. Yes, Meno; but a principle which has any soundness should stand

firm not only just now, but always.

Men. Well; and why are you so slow of heart to believe that

knowledge is virtue?

Soc. I will try and tell you why, Meno. I do not retract the