meno   

question is whether they were also good teachers of their own

virtue;-not whether there are, or have been, good men in this part

of the world, but whether virtue can be taught, is the question

which we have been discussing. Now, do we mean to say that the good

men our own and of other times knew how to impart to others that

virtue which they had themselves; or is virtue a thing incapable of

being communicated or imparted by one man to another? That is the

question which I and Meno have been arguing. Look at the matter in

your own way: Would you not admit that Themistocles was a good man?

Any. Certainly; no man better.

Soc. And must not he then have been a good teacher, if any man

ever was a good teacher, of his own virtue?

Any. Yes certainly,-if he wanted to be so.

Soc. But would he not have wanted? He would, at any rate, have

desired to make his own son a good man and a gentleman; he could not

have been jealous of him, or have intentionally abstained from

imparting to him his own virtue. Did you never hear that he made his

son Cleophantus a famous horseman; and had him taught to stand upright

on horseback and hurl a javelin, and to do many other marvellous

things; and in anything which could be learned from a master he was

well trained? Have you not heard from our elders of him?

Any. I have.

Soc. Then no one could say that his son showed any want of capacity?

Any. Very likely not.

Soc. But did any one, old or young, ever say in your hearing that

Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, was a wise or good man, as his

father was?

Any. I have certainly never heard any one say so.

Soc. And if virtue could have been taught, would his father

Themistocles have sought to train him in these minor

accomplishments, and allowed him who, as you must remember, was his

own son, to be no better than his neighbours in those qualities in