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Soc. And in supposing that they will be useful only if they are true

guides to us of action-there we were also right?

Men. Yes.

Soc. But when we said that a man cannot be a good guide unless he

have knowledge (phrhonesis), this we were wrong.

Men. What do you mean by the word "right"?

Soc. I will explain. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or anywhere

else, and went to the place and led others thither, would he not be

a right and good guide?

Men. Certainly.

Soc. And a person who had a right opinion about the way, but had

never been and did not know, might be a good guide also, might he not?

Men. Certainly.

Soc. And while he has true opinion about that which the other knows,

he will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth, as he who

knows the truth?

Men. Exactly.

Soc. Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as

knowledge; and that was the point which we omitted in our

speculation about the nature of virtue, when we said that knowledge

only is the guide of right action; whereas there is also right

opinion.

Men. True.

Soc. Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge?

Men. The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has knowledge

will always be right; but he who has right opinion will sometimes be

right, and sometimes not.

Soc. What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has right opinion, so

long as he has right opinion?

Men. I admit the cogency of your argument, and therefore,

Socrates, I wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right

opinion-or why they should ever differ.