parmenides   

like and unlike in the degree in which they participate in both? And

may not all things partake of both opposites, and be both like and

unlike, by reason of this participation?-Where is the wonder? Now if a

person could prove the absolute like to become unlike, or the absolute

unlike to become like, that, in my opinion, would indeed be a

wonder; but there is nothing extraordinary, Zeno, in showing that

the things which only partake of likeness and unlikeness experience

both. Nor, again, if a person were to show that all is one by

partaking of one, and at the same time many by partaking of many,

would that be very astonishing. But if he were to show me that the

absolute one was many, or the absolute many one, I should be truly

amazed. And so of all the rest: I should be surprised to hear that the

natures or ideas themselves had these opposite qualities; but not if a

person wanted to prove of me that I was many and also one. When he

wanted to show that I was many he would say that I have a right and

a left side, and a front and a back, and an upper and a lower half,

for I cannot deny that I partake of multitude; when, on the other

hand, he wants to prove that I am one, he will say, that we who are

here assembled are seven, and that I am one and partake of the one. In

both instances he proves his case. So again, if a person shows that

such things as wood, stones, and the like, being many are also one, we

admit that he shows the coexistence the one and many, but he does

not show that the many are one or the one many; he is uttering not a

paradox but a truism. If however, as I just now suggested, some one

were to abstract simple notions of like, unlike, one, many, rest,

motion, and similar ideas, and then to show that these admit of

admixture and separation in themselves, I should be very much

astonished. This part of the argument appears to be treated by you,

Zeno, in a very spirited manner; but, as I was saying, I should be far

more amazed if any one found in the ideas themselves which are

apprehended by reason, the same puzzle and entanglement which you have

shown to exist in visible objects.