parmenides   

argues that these ideas, being such as we say they ought to be, must

remain unknown, no one can prove to him that he is wrong, unless he

who denies their existence be a man of great ability and knowledge,

and is willing to follow a long and laborious demonstration; he will

remain unconvinced, and still insist that they cannot be known.

What do you mean, Parmenides? said Socrates.

In the first place, I think, Socrates, that you, or any one who

maintains the existence of absolute essences, will admit that they

cannot exist in us.

No, said Socrates; for then they would be no longer absolute.

True, he said; and therefore when ideas are what they are in

relation to one another, their essence is determined by a relation

among themselves, and has nothing to do with the resemblances, or

whatever they are to be termed, which are in our sphere, and from

which we receive this or that name when we partake of them. And the

things which are within our sphere and have the same names with

them, are likewise only relative to one another, and not to the

ideas which have the same names with them, but belong to themselves

and not to them.

What do you mean? said Socrates.

I may illustrate my meaning in this way, said Parmenides:-A master

has a slave; now there is nothing absolute in the relation between

them, which is simply a relation of one man to another. But there is

also an idea of mastership in the abstract, which is relative to the

idea of slavery in the abstract. These natures have nothing to do with

us, nor we with them; they are concerned with themselves only, and

we with ourselves. Do you see my meaning?

Yes, said Socrates, I quite see your meaning.

And will not knowledge-I mean absolute knowledge-answer to

absolute truth?

Certainly.

And each kind of absolute knowledge will answer to each kind of