parmenides   

And in either case, the one would be many, and not one?

True.

But, surely, it ought to be one and not many?

It ought.

Then, if the one is to remain one, it will not be a whole, and

will not have parts?

No.

But if it has no parts, it will have neither beginning, middle,

nor end; for these would of course be parts of it.

Right.

But then, again, a beginning and an end are the limits of

everything?

Certainly.

Then the one, having neither beginning nor end, is unlimited?

Yes, unlimited.

And therefore formless; for it cannot partake either of round or

straight.

But why?

Why, because the round is that of which all the extreme points are

equidistant from the centre?

Yes.

And the straight is that of which the centre intercepts the view

of the extremes?

True.

Then the one would have parts and would be many, if it partook

either of a straight or of a circular form?

Assuredly.

But having no parts, it will be neither straight nor round?

Right.

And, being of such a nature, it cannot be in any place, for it

cannot be either in another or in itself.

How so?