parmenides   

Because if it were in another, it would be encircled by that in

which it was, and would touch it at many places and with many parts;

but that which is one and indivisible, and does not partake of a

circular nature, cannot be touched all round in many places.

Certainly not.

But if, on the other hand, one were in itself, it would also be

contained by nothing else but itself; that is to say, if it were

really in itself; for nothing can be in anything which does not

contain it.

Impossible.

But then, that which contains must be other than that which is

contained? for the same whole cannot do and suffer both at once; and

if so, one will be no longer one, but two?

True.

Then one cannot be anywhere, either in itself or in another?

No.

Further consider, whether that which is of such a nature can have

either rest or motion.

Why not?

Why, because the one, if it were moved, would be either moved in

place or changed in nature; for these are the only kinds of motion.

Yes.

And the one, when it changes and ceases to be itself, cannot be

any longer one.

It cannot.

It cannot therefore experience the sort of motion which is change of

nature?

Clearly not.

Then can the motion of the one be in place?

Perhaps.

But if the one moved in place, must it not either move round and

round in the same place, or from one place to another?