parmenides   

But if not by virtue of being one, not by virtue of itself; and if

not by virtue of itself, not itself, and itself not being other at

all, will not be other than anything?

Right.

Neither will one be the same with itself.

How not?

Surely the nature of the one is not the nature of the same.

Why not?

It is not when anything becomes the same with anything that it

becomes one.

What of that?

Anything which becomes the same with the many, necessarily becomes

many and not one.

True.

But, if there were no difference between the one and the same,

when a thing became the same, it would always become one; and when

it became one, the same?

Certainly.

And, therefore, if one be the same with itself, it is not one with

itself, and will therefore be one and also not one.

Surely that is impossible.

And therefore the one can neither be other than other, nor the

same with itself.

Impossible.

And thus the one can neither be the same, nor other, either in

relation to itself or other?

No.

Neither will the one be like anything or unlike itself or other.

Why not?

Because likeness is sameness of affections.

Yes.

And sameness has been shown to be of a nature distinct from oneness?