parmenides   

That has been shown.

But if the one had any other affection than that of being one, it

would be affected in such a way as to be more than one; which is

impossible.

True.

Then the one can never be so affected as to be the same either

with another or with itself?

Clearly not.

Then it cannot be like another, or like itself?

No.

Nor can it be affected so as to be other, for then it would be

affected in such a way as to be more than one.

It would.

That which is affected otherwise than itself or another, will be

unlike itself or another, for sameness of affections is likeness.

True.

But the one, as appears, never being affected otherwise, is never

unlike itself or other?

Never.

Then the one will never be either like or unlike itself or other?

Plainly not.

Again, being of this nature, it can neither be equal nor unequal

either to itself or to other.

How is that?

Why, because the one if equal must be of the same measures as that

to which it is equal.

True.

And if greater or less than things which are commensurable with

it, the one will have more measures than that which is less, and fewer

than that which is greater?

Yes.

And so of things which are not commensurate with it, the one will