parmenides   

have greater measures than that which is less and smaller than that

which is greater.

Certainly.

But how can that which does not partake of sameness, have either the

same measures or have anything else the same?

Impossible.

And not having the same measures, the one cannot be equal either

with itself or with another?

It appears so.

But again, whether it have fewer or more measures, it will have as

many parts as it has measures; and thus again the one will be no

longer one but will have as many parts as measures.

Right.

And if it were of one measure, it would be equal to that measure;

yet it has been shown to be incapable of equality.

It has.

Then it will neither partake of one measure, nor of many, nor of

few, nor of the same at all, nor be equal to itself or another; nor be

greater or less than itself, or other?

Certainly.

Well, and do we suppose that one can be older, or younger than

anything, or of the same age with it?

Why not?

Why, because that which is of the same age with itself or other,

must partake of equality or likeness of time; and we said that the one

did not partake either of equality or of likeness?

We did say so.

And we also said, that it did not partake of inequality or

unlikeness.

Very true.

How then can one, being of this nature, be either older or younger

than anything, or have the same age with it?