parmenides   

In no way.

Then one cannot be older or younger, or of the same age, either with

itself or with another?

Clearly not.

Then the one, being of this nature, cannot be in time at all; for

must not that which is in time, be always growing older than itself?

Certainly.

And that which is older, must always be older than something which

is younger?

True.

Then, that which becomes older than itself, also becomes at the same

time younger than itself, if it is to have something to become older

than.

What do you mean?

I mean this:-A thing does not need to become different from

another thing which is already different; it is different, and if

its different has become, it has become different; if its different

will be, it will be different; but of that which is becoming

different, there cannot have been, or be about to be, or yet be, a

different-the only different possible is one which is becoming.

That is inevitable.

But, surely, the elder is a difference relative to the younger,

and to nothing else.

True.

Then that which becomes older than itself must also, at the same

time, become younger than itself?

Yes.

But again, it is true that it cannot become for a longer or for a

shorter time than itself, but it must become, and be, and have become,

and be about to be, for the same time with itself?

That again is inevitable.

Then things which are in time, and partake of time, must in every