parmenides   

Then there is no name, nor expression, nor perception, nor

opinion, nor knowledge of it?

Clearly not.

Then it is neither named, nor expressed, nor opined, nor known,

nor does anything that is perceive it.

So we must infer.

But can all this be true about the one?

I think not.



Suppose, now, that we return once more to the original hypothesis;

let us see whether, on a further review, any new aspect of the

question appears.

I shall be very happy to do so.

We say that we have to work out together all the consequences,

whatever they may be, which follow, if the one is?

Yes.

Then we will begin at the beginning:-If one is, can one be, and

not partake of being?

Impossible.

Then the one will have being, but its being will not be the same

with the one; for if the same, it would not be the being of the one;

nor would the one have participated in being, for the proposition that

one is would have been identical with the proposition that one is one;

but our hypothesis is not if one is one, what will follow, but if

one is:-am I not right?

Quite right.

We mean to say, that being has not the same significance as one?

Of course.

And when we put them together shortly, and say "One is," that is

equivalent to saying, "partakes of being"?

Quite true.

Once more then let us ask, if one is what will follow. Does not this