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parmenides   
It cannot.
Then, if the individuals of the pair are together two, they must
be severally one?
Clearly.
And if each of them is one, then by the addition of any one to any
pair, the whole becomes three?
Yes.
And three are odd, and two are even?
Of course.
And if there are two there must also be twice, and if there are
three there must be thrice; that is, if twice one makes two, and
thrice one three?
Certainly.
There are two, and twice, and therefore there must be twice two; and
there are three, and there is thrice, and therefore there must be
thrice three?
Of course.
If there are three and twice, there is twice three; and if there are
two and thrice, there is thrice two?
Undoubtedly.
Here, then, we have even taken even times, and odd taken odd
times, and even taken odd times, and odd taken even times.
True.
And if this is so, does any number remain which has no necessity
to be?
None whatever.
Then if one is, number must also be?
It must.
But if there is number, there must also be many, and infinite
multiplicity of being; for number is infinite in multiplicity, and
partakes also of being: am I not right?
Certainly.
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