parmenides   

into the greatest number of parts. For it is not distributed into

parts more than the one, into parts equal to the one; the one is never

wanting to being, or being to the one, but being two they are co-equal

and coextensive.

Certainly that is true.

The one itself, then, having been broken up into parts by being,

is many and infinite?

True.

Then not only the one which has being is many, but the one itself

distributed by being, must also be many?

Certainly.

Further, inasmuch as the parts are parts of a whole, the one, as a

whole, will be limited; for are not the parts contained the whole?

Certainly.

And that which contains, is a limit?

Of course.

Then the one if it has being is one and many, whole and parts,

having limits and yet unlimited in number?

Clearly.

And because having limits, also having extremes?

Certainly.

And if a whole, having beginning and middle and end. For can

anything be a whole without these three? And if any one of them is

wanting to anything, will that any longer be a whole?

No.

Then the one, as appears, will have beginning, middle, and end.

It will.

But, again, the middle will be equidistant from the extremes; or

it would not be in the middle?

Yes.

Then the one will partake of figure, either rectilinear or round, or

a union of the two?