parmenides   

True.

And if this is the case, it will be both in itself and in another

too.

How?

Every part is in the whole, and none is outside the whole.

True.

And all the parts are contained by the whole?

Yes.

And the one is all its parts, and neither more nor less than all?

No.

And the one is the whole?

Of course.

But if all the parts are in the whole, and the one is all of them

and the whole, and they are all contained by the whole, the one will

be contained by the one; and thus the one will be in itself.

That is true.

But then, again, the whole is not in the parts-neither in all the

parts, nor in some one of them. For if it is in all, it must be in

one; for if there were any one in which it was not, it could not be in

all the parts; for the part in which it is wanting is one of all,

and if the whole is not in this, how can it be in them all?

It cannot.

Nor can the whole be in some of the parts; for if the whole were

in some of the parts, the greater would be in the less, which is

impossible.

Yes, impossible.

But if the whole is neither in one, nor in more than one, nor in all

of the parts, it must be in something else, or cease to be anywhere at

all?

Certainly.

If it were nowhere, it would be nothing; but being a whole, and

not being in itself, it must be in another.