parmenides   

Very true.

The one then, regarded as a whole, is in another, but regarded as

being all its parts, is in itself; and therefore the one must be

itself in itself and also in another.

Certainly.

The one then, being of this nature, is of necessity both at rest and

in motion?

How?

The one is at rest since it is in itself, for being in one, and

not passing out of this, it is in the same, which is itself.

True.

And that which is ever in the same, must be ever at rest?

Certainly.

Well, and must not that, on the contrary, which is ever in other,

never be in the same; and if never in the same, never at rest, and

if not at rest, in motion?

True.

Then the one being always itself in itself and other, must always be

both at rest and in motion?

Clearly.

And must be the same with itself, and other than itself; and also

the same with the others, and other than the others; this follows from

its previous affections.

How so?

Every thing in relation to every other thing, is either the same

or other; or if neither the same nor other, then in the relation of

a part to a whole, or of a whole to a part.

Clearly.

And is the one a part of itself?

Certainly not.

Since it is not a part in relation to itself it cannot be related to

itself as whole to part?