|                   
|
parmenides   
It cannot.
But is the one other than one?
No.
And therefore not other than itself?
Certainly not.
If then it be neither other, nor a whole, nor a part in relation
to itself, must it not be the same with itself?
Certainly.
But then, again, a thing which is in another place from "itself," if
this "itself" remains in the same place with itself, must be other
than "itself," for it will be in another place?
True.
Then the one has been shown to be at once in itself and in another?
Yes.
Thus, then, as appears, the one will be other than itself?
True.
Well, then, if anything be other than anything, will it not be other
than that which is other?
Certainly.
And will not all things that are not one, be other than the one, and
the one other than the not-one?
Of course.
Then the one will be other than the others?
True.
But, consider:-Are not the absolute same, and the absolute other,
opposites to one another?
Of course.
Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same?
They will not.
If then the other is never in the same, there is nothing in which
the other is during any space of time; for during that space of
time, however small, the other would be in the game. Is not that true?
|