parmenides   

Yes.

And since the other-is never in the same, it can never be in anything

that is.

True.

Then the other will never be either in the not one, or in the one?

Certainly not.

Then not by reason of otherness is the one other than the not-one,

or the not-one other than the one.

No.

Nor by reason of themselves will they be other than one another,

if not partaking of the other.

How can they be?

But if they are not other, either by reason of themselves or of

the other, will they not altogether escape being other than one

another?

They will.

Again, the not-one cannot partake of the one; otherwise it would not

have been not-one, but would have been in some way one.

True.

Nor can the not-one be number; for having number, it would not

have been not-one at all.

It would not.

Again, is the not-one part of the one; or rather, would it not in

that case partake of the one?

It would.

If then, in every point of view, the one and the not-one are

distinct, then neither is the one part or whole of the not-one, nor is

the not-one part or whole of the one?

No.

But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes of one

another, nor other than one another, will be the same with one

another: -so we said?