parmenides   

Yes.

Then shall we say that the one, being in this relation to the

not-one, is the same with it?

Let us say so.

Then it is the same with itself and the others, and also other

than itself and the others.

That appears to be the inference. And it will also be like and

unlike itself and the others?

Perhaps.

Since the one was shown to be other than the others, the others will

also be other than the one.

Yes.

And the one is other than the others in the same degree that the

others are other than it, and neither more nor less?

True.

And if neither more nor less, then in a like degree?

Yes.

In virtue of the affection by which the one is other than others and

others in like manner other than it, the one will be affected like the

others and the others like the one.

How do you mean?

I may take as an illustration the case of names: You give a name

to a thing?

Yes.

And you may say the name once or oftener?

Yes.

And when you say it once, you mention that of which it is the

name? and when more than once, is it something else which you mention?

or must it always be the same thing of which you speak, whether you

utter the name once or more than once?

Of course it is the same.

And is not "other" a name given to a thing?