parmenides   

Certainly.

Whenever, then, you use the word "other," whether once or oftener,

you name that of which it is the name, and to no other do you give the

name?

True.

Then when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one

other than the others, in repeating the word "other" we speak of

that nature to which the name is applied, and of no other?

Quite true.

Then the one which is other than others, and the other which is

other than the one, in that the word "other" is applied to both,

will be in the same condition; and that which is in the same condition

is like?

Yes.

Then in virtue of the affection by which the one is other than the

others, every thing will be like every thing, for every thing is other

than every thing.

True.

Again, the like is opposed to the unlike?

Yes.

And the other to the same?

True again.

And the one was also shown to be the same with the others?

Yes.

And to be, the same with the others is the opposite of being other

than the others?

Certainly.

And in that it was other it was shown to be like?

Yes.

But in that it was the same it will be unlike by virtue of the

opposite affection to that which made it and this was the affection of

otherness.