parmenides   

greatness, or the one had greatness and the others smallness-whichever

kind had greatness would be greater, and whichever had smallness would

be smaller?

Certainly.

Then there are two such ideas as greatness and smallness; for if

they were not they could not be opposed to each other and be present

in that which is.

How could they?

If, then, smallness is present in the one it will be present

either in the whole or in a part of the whole?

Certainly.

Suppose the first; it will be either co-equal and co-extensive

with the whole one, or will contain the one?

Clearly.

If it be co-extensive with the one it will be coequal with the

one, or if containing the one it will be greater than the one?

Of course.

But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, and

have the functions of greatness and equality and not its own

functions?

Impossible.

Then smallness cannot be in the whole of one, but, if at all, in a

part only?

Yes.

And surely not in all of a part, for then the difficulty of the

whole will recur; it will be equal to or greater than any part in

which it is.

Certainly.

Then smallness will not be in anything, whether in a whole or in a

part; nor will there be anything small but actual smallness.

True.

Neither will greatness be in the one, for if greatness be in