parmenides   

Now there cannot possibly be anything which is not included in the

one and the others?

Of course not.

But, surely, that which is must always be somewhere?

Yes.

But that which is in anything will be less, and that in which it

is will be greater; in no other way can one thing be in another.

True.

And since there is nothing other or besides the one and the

others, and they must be in something, must they not be in one

another, the one in the others and the others in the one, if they

are to be anywhere?

That is clear.

But inasmuch as the one is in the others, the others will be greater

than the one, because they contain the one, which will be less than

the others, because it is contained in them; and inasmuch as the

others are in the one, the one on the same principle will be greater

than the others, and the others less than the one.

True.

The one, then, will be equal to and greater and less than itself and

the others?

Clearly.

And if it be greater and less and equal, it will be of equal and

more and less measures or divisions than itself and the others, and if

of measures, also of parts?

Of course.

And if of equal and more and less measures or divisions, it will

be in number more or less than itself and the others, and likewise

equal in number to itself and to the others?

How is that?

It will be of more measures than those things which it exceeds,

and of as many parts as measures; and so with that to which it is