parmenides   

equal, and that than which it is less.

True.

And being greater and less than itself, and equal to itself, it will

be of equal measures with itself and of more and fewer measures than

itself; and if of measures then also of parts?

It will.

And being of equal parts with itself, it will be numerically equal

to itself; and being of more parts, more, and being of less, less than

itself?

Certainly.

And the same will hold of its relation to other things; inasmuch

as it is greater than them, it will be more in number than them; and

inasmuch as it is smaller, it will be less in number; and inasmuch

as it is equal in size to other things, it will be equal to them in

number.

Certainly.

Once more then, as would appear, the one will be in number both

equal to and more and less than both itself and all other things.

It will.



Does the one also partake of time? And is it and does it become

older and younger than itself and others, and again, neither younger

nor older than itself and others, by virtue of participation in time?

How do you mean?

If one is, being must be predicated of it?

Yes.

But to be (einai) is only participation of being in present time,

and to have been is the participation of being at a past time, and

to be about to be is the participation of being at a future time?

Very true.

Then the one, since it partakes of being, partakes of time?

Certainly.