phaedo   

is, indissoluble.

Yes; that is what I should imagine, said Cebes.

And the uncompounded may be assumed to be the same and unchanging,

where the compound is always changing and never the same?

That I also think, he said.

Then now let us return to the previous discussion. Is that idea or

essence, which in the dialectical process we define as essence of true

existence-whether essence of equality, beauty, or anything else: are

these essences, I say, liable at times to some degree of change? or

are they each of them always what they are, having the same simple,

self-existent and unchanging forms, and not admitting of variation

at all, or in any way, or at any time?

They must be always the same, Socrates, replied Cebes.

And what would you say of the many beautiful-whether men or horses

or garments or any other things which may be called equal or

beautiful-are they all unchanging and the same always, or quite the

reverse? May they not rather be described as almost always changing

and hardly ever the same either with themselves or with one another?

The latter, replied Cebes; they are always in a state of change.

And these you can touch and see and perceive with the senses, but

the unchanging things you can only perceive with the mind-they are

invisible and are not seen?

That is very true, he said.

Well, then, he added, let us suppose that there are two sorts of

existences, one seen, the other unseen.

Let us suppose them.

The seen is the changing, and the unseen is the unchanging.

That may be also supposed.

And, further, is not one part of us body, and the rest of us soul?

To be sure.

And to which class may we say that the body is more alike and akin?

Clearly to the seen: no one can doubt that.