phaedrus   

yourself?

Soc. When any one speaks of iron and silver, is not the same thing

present in the minds of all?

Phaedr. Certainly.

Soc. But when any one speaks of justice and goodness we part company

and are at odds with one another and with ourselves?

Phaedr. Precisely.

Soc. Then in some things we agree, but not in others?

Phaedr. That is true.

Soc. In which are we more likely to be deceived, and in which has

rhetoric the greater power?

Phaedr. Clearly, in the uncertain class.

Soc. Then the rhetorician ought to make a regular division, and

acquire a distinct notion of both classes, as well of that in which

the many err, as of that in which they do not err?

Phaedr. He who made such a distinction would have an excellent

principle.

Soc. Yes; and in the next place he must have a keen eye for the

observation of particulars in speaking, and not make a mistake about

the class to which they are to be referred.

Phaedr. Certainly.

Soc. Now to which class does love belong-to the debatable or to

the undisputed class?

Phaedr. To the debatable, clearly; for if not, do you think that

love would have allowed you to say as you did, that he is an evil both

to the lover and the beloved, and also the greatest possible good?

Soc. Capital. But will you tell me whether I defined love at the

beginning of my speech? for, having been in an ecstasy, I cannot

well remember.

Phaedr. Yes, indeed; that you did, and no mistake.

Soc. Then I perceive that the Nymphs of Achelous and Pan the son

of Hermes, who inspired me, were far better rhetoricians than Lysias