philebus   

Socrates. Observe, Protarchus, the nature of the position which

you are now going to take from Philebus, and what the other position

is which I maintain, and which, if you do not approve of it, is to

be controverted by you. Shall you and I sum up the two sides?

Protarchus. By all means.

Soc. Philebus was saying that enjoyment and pleasure and delight,

and the class of feelings akin to them, are a good to every living

being, whereas I contend, that not these, but wisdom and

intelligence and memory, and their kindred, right opinion and true

reasoning, are better and more desirable than pleasure for all who are

able to partake of them, and that to all such who are or ever will

be they are the most advantageous of all things. Have I not given,

Philebus, a fair statement of the two sides of the argument?

Philebus Nothing could be fairer, Socrates.

Soc. And do you, the position which is assigned to you?

Pro. I cannot do otherwise, since our excellent Philebus has left

the field.

Soc. Surely the truth about these matters ought, by all means, to be

ascertained.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Shall we further agree-

Pro. To what?

Soc. That you and I must now try to indicate some state and

disposition of the soul, which has the property of making all men

happy.

Pro. Yes, by all means.

Soc. And you say that pleasure and I say that wisdom, is such a

state?

Pro. True.

Soc. And what if there be a third state, which is better than

either? Then both of us are vanquished-are we not? But if this life,

which really has the power of making men happy, turn out to be more