philebus   

akin to pleasure than to wisdom, the life of pleasure may still have

the advantage over the life of wisdom.

Pro. True.

Soc. Or suppose that the better life is more nearly allied to

wisdom, then wisdom conquers, and pleasure is defeated;-do you agree?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And what do you say, Philebus?

Phi. I say; and shall always say, that pleasure is easily the

conqueror; but you must decide for yourself, Protarchus.

Pro. You, Philebus, have handed over the argument to me, and have no

longer a voice in the matter?

Phi. True enough. Nevertheless I would dear myself and deliver my

soul of you; and I call the goddess herself to witness that I now do

so.

Pro. You may appeal to us; we too be the witnesses of your words.

And now, Socrates, whether Philebus is pleased or displeased, we

will proceed with the argument.

Soc. Then let us begin with the goddess herself, of whom Philebus

says that she is called Aphrodite, but that her real name is Pleasure.

Pro. Very good.

Soc. The awe which I always feel, Protarchus, about the names of the

gods is more than human-it exceeds all other fears. And now I would

not sin against Aphrodite by naming her amiss; let her be called

what she pleases. But Pleasure I know to be manifold, and with her, as

I was just now saying, we must begin, and consider what her nature is.

She has one name, and therefore you would imagine that she is one; and

yet surely she takes the most varied and even unlike forms. For do

we not say that the intemperate has pleasure, and that the temperate

has pleasure in his very temperance-that the fool is pleased when he

is full of foolish fancies and hopes, and that the wise man has

pleasure in his wisdom? and how foolish would any one be who

affirmed that all these opposite pleasures are severally alike!