philebus   

Pro. Why, Socrates, they are opposed in so far as they spring from

opposite sources, but they are not in themselves opposite. For must

not pleasure be of all things most absolutely like pleasure-that is,

like himself?

Soc. Yes, my good friend, just as colour is like colour;-in so far

as colours are colours, there is no difference between them; and yet

we all know that black is not only unlike, but even absolutely opposed

to white: or again, as figure is like figure, for all figures are

comprehended under one class; and yet particular figures may be

absolutely opposed to one another, and there is an infinite

diversity of them. And we might find similar examples in many other

things; therefore do not rely upon this argument, which would go to

prove the unity of the most extreme opposites. And I suspect that we

shall find a similar opposition among pleasures.

Pro. Very likely; but how will this invalidate the argument?

Soc. Why, I shall reply, that dissimilar as they are, you apply to

them a now predicate, for you say that all pleasant things are good;

now although no one can argue that pleasure is not pleasure, he may

argue, as we are doing, that pleasures are oftener bad than good;

but you call them all good, and at the same time are compelled, if you

are pressed, to acknowledge that they are unlike. And so you must tell

us what is the identical quality existing alike in good and bad

pleasures, which makes. you designate all of them as good.

Pro. What do you mean, Socrates? Do you think that any one who

asserts pleasure to be the good, will tolerate the notion that some

Pleasures are good and others bad?

Soc. And yet you will acknowledge that they are different from one

another, and sometimes opposed?

Pro. Not in so far as they are pleasures.

Soc. That is a return to the old position, Protarchus, and so we are

to say (are we?) that there is no difference in pleasures, but that

they are all alike; and the examples which have just been cited do not