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philebus   


light in the hope that, in the process of testing them, they may

show whether pleasure is to be called the good, or wisdom, or some

third quality; for surely we are not now simply contending in order

that my view or that yours may prevail, but I presume that we ought

both of us to be fighting for the truth.

Pro. Certainly we ought.

Soc. Then let us have a more definite understanding and establish

the principle on which the argument rests.

Pro. What principle?

Soc. A principle about which all men are always in a difficulty, and

some men sometimes against their will.

Pro. Speak plainer.

Soc. The principle which has just turned up, which is a marvel of

nature; for that one should be many or many one, are wonderful

propositions; and he who affirms either is very open to attack.

Pro. Do you mean, when a person says that I, Protarchus, am by

nature one and also many, dividing the single "me" into many "mens,"

and even opposing them as great and small, light and heavy, and in ten

thousand other ways?

Soc. Those, Protarchus, are the common and acknowledged paradoxes

about the one and many, which I may say that everybody has by this

time agreed to dismiss as childish and obvious and detrimental to

the true course of thought; and no more favour is shown to that

other puzzle, in which a person proves the members and parts of

anything to be divided, and then confessing that they are all one,

says laughingly in disproof of his own words: Why, here is a

miracle, the one is many and infinite, and the many are only one.

Pro. But what, Socrates, are those other marvels connected with this

subject which, as you imply, have not yet become common and

acknowledged?

Soc. When, my boy, the one does not belong to the class of things

that are born and perish, as in the instances which we were giving,

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