philebus   

for in those cases, and when unity is of this concrete nature, there

is, as I was saying, a universal consent that no refutation is needed;

but when the assertion is made that man is one, or ox is one, or

beauty one, or the good one, then the interest which attaches to these

and similar unities and the attempt which is made to divide them gives

birth to a controversy.

Pro. Of what nature?

Soc. In the first place, as to whether these unities have a real

existence; and then how each individual unity, being always the

same, and incapable either of generation of destruction, but retaining

a permanent individuality, can be conceived either as dispersed and

multiplied in the infinity of the world of generation, or as still

entire and yet divided from itself, which latter would seem to be

the greatest impossibility of all, for how can one and the same

thing be at the same time in one and in many things? These,

Protarchus, are the real difficulties, and this is the one and many to

which they relate; they are the source of great perplexity if ill

decided, and the right determination of them is very helpful.

Pro. Then, Socrates, let us begin by clearing up these questions.

Soc. That is what I should wish.

Pro. And I am sure that all my other friends will be glad to hear

them discussed; Philebus, fortunately for us, is not disposed to move,

and we had better not stir him up with questions.

Soc. Good; and where shall we begin this great and multifarious

battle, in which such various points are at issue? Shall begin thus?

Pro. How?

Soc. We say that the one and many become identified by thought,

and that now, as in time past, they run about together, in and out

of every word which is uttered, and that this union of them will never

cease, and is not now beginning, but is, as I believe, an

everlasting quality of thought itself, which never grows old. Any

young man, when he first tastes these subtleties, is delighted, and