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philebus   
idea of that which is the subject of enquiry; this unity we shall find
in everything. Having found it, we may next proceed to look for two,
if there be two, or, if not, then for three or some other number,
subdividing each of these units, until at last the unity with which we
began is seen not only to be one and many and infinite, but also a
definite number; the infinite must not be suffered to approach the
many until the entire number of the species intermediate between unity
and infinity has been discovered-then, and not till then, we may, rest
from division, and without further troubling ourselves about the
endless individuals may allow them to drop into infinity. This, as I
was saying, is the way of considering and learning and teaching one
another, which the gods have handed down to us. But the wise men of
our time are either too quick or too slow, in conceiving plurality
in unity. Having no method, they make their one and many anyhow, and
from unity pass at once to infinity; the intermediate steps never
occur to them. And this, I repeat, is what makes the difference
between the mere art of disputation and true dialectic.
Pro. I think that I partly understand you Socrates, but I should
like to have a clearer notion of what you are saying.
Soc. I may illustrate my meaning by the letters of the alphabet,
Protarchus, which you were made to learn as a child.
Pro. How do they afford an illustration?
Soc. The sound which passes through the lips whether of an
individual or of all men is one and yet infinite.
Pro. Very true.
Soc. And yet not by knowing either that sound is one or that sound
is infinite are we perfect in the art of speech, but the knowledge
of the number and nature of sounds is what makes a man a grammarian.
Pro. Very true.
Soc. And the knowledge which makes a man a musician is of the same
kind.
Pro. How so?
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