philebus   

individual unity, should proceed from that, not to infinity, but to

a definite number, and now I say conversely, that he who has to

begin with infinity should not jump to unity, but he should look about

for some number, representing a certain quantity, and thus out of

all end in one. And now let us return for an illustration of our

principle to the case of letters.

Pro. What do you mean?

Soc. Some god or divine man, who in the Egyptian legend is said to

have been Theuth, observing that the human voice was infinite, first

distinguished in this infinity a certain number of vowels, and then

other letters which had sound, but were not pure vowels (i.e., the

semivowels); these too exist in a definite number; and lastly, he

distinguished a third class of letters which we now call mutes,

without voice and without sound, and divided these, and likewise the

two other classes of vowels and semivowels, into the individual

sounds, told the number of them, and gave to each and all of them

the name of letters; and observing that none of us could learn any one

of them and not learn them all, and in consideration of this common

bond which in a manner united them, he assigned to them all a single

art, and this he called the art of grammar or letters.

Phi. The illustration, Protarchus, has assisted me in

understanding the original statement, but I still feel the defect of

which I just now complained.

Soc. Are you going to ask, Philebus, what this has to do with the

argument?

Phi. Yes, that is a question which Protarchus and I have been long

asking.

Soc. Assuredly you have already arrived at the answer to the

question which, as you say, you have been so long asking?

Phi. How so?

Soc. Did we not begin by enquiring into the comparative

eligibility of pleasure and wisdom?