philebus   

Phi. Certainly.

Soc. And we maintain that they are each of them one?

Phi. True.

Soc. And the precise question to which the previous discussion

desires an answer is, how they are one and also many [i.e., how they

have one genus and many species], and are not at once infinite, and

what number of species is to be assigned to either of them before they

pass into infinity.

Pro. That is a very serious question, Philebus, to which Socrates

has ingeniously brought us round, and please to consider which of us

shall answer him; there may be something ridiculous in my being unable

to answer, and therefore imposing the task upon you, when I have

undertaken the whole charge of the argument, but if neither of us were

able to answer, the result methinks would be still more ridiculous.

Let us consider, then, what we are to do:-Socrates, if I understood

him rightly, is asking whether there are not kinds of pleasure, and

what is the number and nature of them, and the same of wisdom.

Soc. Most true, O son of Callias; and the previous argument showed

that if we are not able to tell the kinds of everything that has

unity, likeness, sameness, or their opposites, none of us will be of

the smallest use in any enquiry.

Pro. That seems to be very near the truth, Socrates. Happy would the

wise man be if he knew all things, and the next best thing for him

is that he should know himself. Why do I say so at this moment? I will

tell you. You, Socrates, have granted us this opportunity of

conversing with you, and are ready to assist us in determining what is

the best of human goods. For when Philebus said that pleasure and

delight and enjoyment and the like were the chief good, you

answered-No, not those, but another class of goods; and we are

constantly reminding ourselves of what you said, and very properly, in

order that we may not forget to examine and compare the two. And these

goods, which in your opinion are to be designated as superior to