philebus   

pleasure, and are the true objects of pursuit, are mind and

knowledge and understanding and art and the like. There was a

dispute about which were the best, and we playfully threatened that

you should not be allowed to go home until the question was settled;

and you agreed, and placed yourself at our disposal. And now, as

children say, what has been fairly given cannot be taken back; cease

then to fight against us in this way.

Soc. In what way?

Phi. Do not perplex us, and keep asking questions of us to which

we have not as yet any sufficient answer to give; let us not imagine

that a general puzzling of us all is to be the end of our

discussion, but if we are unable to answer, do you answer, as you have

promised. Consider, then, whether you will divide pleasure and

knowledge according to their kinds; or you may let the matter drop, if

you are able and willing to find some other mode of clearing up our

controversy.

Soc. If you say that, I have nothing to apprehend, for the words "if

you are willing" dispel all my fear; and, moreover, a god seems to

have recalled something to my mind.

Phi. What is that?

Soc. I remember to have heard long ago certain discussions about

pleasure and wisdom, whether awake or in a dream I cannot tell; they

were to the effect that neither the one nor the other of them was

the good, but some third thing, which was different from them, and

better than either. If this be clearly established, then pleasure will

lose the victory, for the good will cease to be identified with

her:-Am I not right?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And there will cease to be any need of distinguishing the kinds

of pleasures, as I am inclined to think, but this will appear more

clearly as we proceed.

Pro. Capital, Socrates; pray go on as you propose.