philebus   

Pro. Why should I? Having pleasure I should have all things.

Soc. Living thus, you would always throughout your life enjoy the

greatest pleasures?

Pro. I should.

Soc. But if you had neither mind, nor memory, nor knowledge, nor

true opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of

whether you were pleased or not, because you would be entirely

devoid of intelligence.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And similarly, if you had no memory you would not recollect

that you had ever been pleased, nor would the slightest recollection

of the pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you; and if

you had no true opinion you would not think that you were pleased when

you were; and if you had no power of calculation you would not be able

to calculate on future pleasure, and your life would be the life,

not of a man, but of an oyster or pulmo marinus. Could this be

otherwise?

Pro. No.

Soc. But is such a life eligible?

Pro. I cannot answer you, Socrates; the argument has taken away from

me the power of speech.

Soc. We must keep up our spirits;-let us now take the life of mind

and examine it in turn.

Pro. And what is this life of mind?

Soc. I want to know whether any one of us would consent to live,

having wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory of all things, but

having no sense of pleasure or pain, and wholly unaffected by these

and the like feelings?

Pro. Neither life, Socrates, appears eligible to me, or is likely,

as I should imagine, to be chosen by any one else.

Soc. What would you say, Protarchus, to both of these in one, or

to one that was made out of the union of the two?