philebus   

Pro. Out of the union, that is, of pleasure with mind and wisdom?

Soc. Yes, that is the life which I mean.

Pro. There can be no difference of opinion; not some but all would

surely choose this third rather than either of the other two, and in

addition to them.

Soc. But do you see the consequence?

Pro. To be sure I do. The consequence is, that two out of the

three lives which have been proposed are neither sufficient nor

eligible for man or for animal.

Soc. Then now there can be no doubt that neither of them has the

good, for the one which had would certainly have been sufficient and

perfect and eligible for every living creature or thing that was

able to live such a life; and if any of us had chosen any other, he

would have chosen contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, and

not of his own free will, but either through ignorance or from some

unhappy necessity.

Pro. Certainly that seems to be true.

Soc. And now have I not sufficiently shown that Philebus, goddess is

not to be regarded as identical with the good?

Phi. Neither is your "mind" the good, Socrates, for that will be

open to the same objections.

Soc. Perhaps, Philebus, you may be right in saying so of my

"mind"; but of the true, which is also the divine mind, far otherwise.

However, I will not at present claim the first place for mind as

against the mixed life; but we must come to some understanding about

the second place. For you might affirm pleasure and I mind to be the

cause of the mixed life; and in that case although neither of them

would be the good, one of them might be imagined to be the cause of

the good. And I might proceed further to argue in opposition to

Phoebus, that the element which makes this mixed life eligible and

good, is more akin and more similar to mind than to pleasure. And if

this is true, pleasure cannot be truly said to share either in the