philebus   

Soc. The other class of pleasures, which as we were saying is purely

mental, is entirely derived from memory.

Pro. What do you mean?

Soc. I must first of all analyse memory, or rather perception

which is prior to, memory, if the subject of our discussion is ever to

be properly cleared up.

Pro. How will you proceed?

Soc. Let us imagine affections of the body which are extinguished

before they reach the soul, and leave her unaffected; and again, other

affections which vibrate through both soul and body, and impart a

shock to both and to each of them.

Pro. Granted.

Soc. And the soul may be truly said to be oblivious of the first but

not of the second?

Pro. Quite true.

Soc. When I say oblivious, do not suppose that I mean

forgetfulness in a literal sense; for forgetfulness is the exit of

memory, which in this case has not yet entered; and to speak of the

loss of that which is not yet in existence, and never has been, is a

contradiction; do you see?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. Then just be so good as to change the terms.

Pro. How shall I change them?

Soc. Instead of the oblivion of the soul, when you are describing

the state in which she is unaffected by the shocks of the body, say

unconsciousness.

Pro. I see.

Soc. And the union or communion of soul and body in one feeling

and motion would be properly called consciousness?

Pro. Most true.

Soc. Then now we know the meaning of the word?

Pro. Yes.