philebus   

Soc. And memory may, I think, be rightly described as the

preservation of consciousness?

Pro. Right.

Soc. But do we not distinguish memory from recollection?

Pro. I think so.

Soc. And do we not mean by recollection the power which the soul has

of recovering, when by herself, some feeling which she experienced

when in company with the body?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And when she recovers of herself the lost recollection of

some consciousness or knowledge, the recovery is termed recollection

and reminiscence?

Pro. Very true.

Soc. There is a reason why I say all this.

Pro. What is it?

Soc. I want to attain the plainest possible notion of pleasure and

desire, as they exist in the mind only, apart from the body; and the

previous analysis helps to show the nature of both.

Pro. Then now, Socrates, let us proceed to the next point.

Soc. There are certainly many things to be considered in

discussing the generation and whole complexion of pleasure. At the

outset we must determine the nature and seat of desire.

Pro. Ay; let us enquire into that, for we shall lose nothing.

Soc. Nay, Protarchus, we shall surely lose the puzzle if we find the

answer.

Pro. A fair retort; but let us proceed.

Soc. Did we not place hunger, thirst, and the like, in the class

of desires?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And yet they are very different; what common nature have we

in view when we call them by a single name?

Pro. By heavens, Socrates, that is a question which is, not easily