philebus   

past pleasures which, if they would only return, would relieve him;

but as yet he has them not. May we not say of him, that he is in an

intermediate state?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Would you say that he was wholly pained or wholly pleased?

Pro. Nay, I should say that he has two pains; in his body there is

the actual experience of pain, and in his soul longing and

expectation.

Soc. What do you mean, Protarchus, by the two pains? May not a man

who is empty have at one time a sure hope of being filled, and at

other times be quite in despair?

Pro. Very true.

Soc. And has he not the pleasure of memory when he is hoping to be

filled, and yet in that he is empty is he not at the same time in

pain?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Then man and the other animals have at the same time both

pleasure and pain?

Pro. I suppose so.

Soc. But when a man is empty and has no hope of being filled,

there will be the double experience of pain. You observed this and

inferred that the double experience was the single case possible.

Pro. Quite true, Socrates.

Soc. Shall the enquiry into these states of feeling be made the

occasion of raising a question?

Pro. What question?

Soc. Whether we ought to say that the pleasures and pains of which

we are speaking are true or false? or some true and some false?

Pro. But how, Socrates, can there be false pleasures and pains?

Soc. And how, Protarchus, can there be true and false fears, or true

and false expectations, or true and false opinions?

Pro. I grant that opinions may be true or false, but not pleasures.