philebus   

it will still be an opinion?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And he who is pleased, whether he is rightly pleased or not

will always have a real feeling of pleasure?

Pro. Yes; that is also quite true.

Soc. Then, how can opinion be both true and false, and pleasure true

only, although pleasure and opinion are both equally real?

Pro. Yes; that is the question.

Soc. You mean that opinion admits of truth and falsehood, and

hence becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality;

and this is what you think should be examined?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And further, even if we admit the existence of qualities in

other objects, may not pleasure and pain be simple and devoid of

quality?

Pro. Clearly.

Soc. But there is no difficulty in seeing that Pleasure and pain

as well as opinion have qualities, for they are great or small, and

have various degrees of intensity; as was indeed said long ago by us.

Pro. Quite true.

Soc. And if badness attaches to any of them, Protarchus, then we

should speak of a bad opinion or of a bad pleasure?

Pro. Quite true, Socrates.

Soc. And if rightness attaches to any of them, should we not speak

of a right opinion or right pleasure; and in like manner of the

reverse of rightness?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And if the thing opined be erroneous, might we not say that

opinion, being erroneous, is not right or rightly opined?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And if we see a pleasure or pain which errs in respect of its

object, shall we call that right or good, or by any honourable name?