philebus   

Pro. Not if the pleasure is mistaken; how could we?

Soc. And surely pleasure often appears to accompany an opinion which

is not true, but false?

Pro. Certainly it does; and in that case, Socrates, as we were

saying, the opinion is false, but no one could call the actual

pleasure false.

Soc. How eagerly, Protarchus, do you rush to the defence of

pleasure!

Pro. Nay, Socrates, I only repeat what I hear.

Soc. And is there no difference, my friend, between that pleasure

which is associated with right opinion and knowledge, and that which

is often found in all of us associated with falsehood and ignorance?

Pro. There must be a very great difference, between them.

Soc. Then, now let us proceed to contemplate this difference.

Pro. Lead, and I will follow.

Soc. Well, then, my view is-

Pro. What is it?

Soc. We agree-do we not?-that there is such a thing as false, and

also such a thing as true opinion?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And pleasure and pain, as I was just now saying, are often

consequent upon these upon true and false opinion, I mean.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. And do not opinion and the endeavour to form an opinion

always spring from memory and perception?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Might we imagine the process to be something of this nature?

Pro. Of what nature?

Soc. An object may be often seen at a distance not very clearly, and

the seer may want to determine what it is which he sees.

Pro. Very likely.

Soc. Soon he begins to interrogate himself.